Pentagon says Army bases are vulnerable

Military says it is trying to improve terror response

Published: Monday, Nov. 15, 2004 9:07 a.m. MST
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Pentagon inspectors say police, firefighters and doctors are still inadequately prepared to respond to attacks using weapons of mass destruction against Army bases — even though the Army had tried, in vain, to improve that after the 9/11 attacks.

"Plans to implement an Installation Preparedness Program for first responders were substantially fragmented and ineffective," according to an Army Audit Agency report, obtained by the Deseret Morning News through a Freedom of Information Act request.

That report, however, is now 11 months old — and the Army, in written responses, said it has been taking numerous steps to improve the situation since it was issued.

The report noted that efforts to improve emergency response plans had their roots in a survey of bases back in 2000, which concluded "that installation first responders weren't adequately equipped, trained or funded to respond to all facets of a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and/or high-yield explosive incident."

So in May 2001, the Army wrote to base commanders outlining "eight critical tasks" they should pursue to improve that. After the 9/11 attacks further increased worry about terrorism, the Army in January 2002 revised rules to clarify who was in charge of different facets of first responder training and equipment .

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The new report looked at how well resulting training and equipment purchases have worked, both for military and civilian first responders. Inspectors said it was "fragmented," "ineffective" and "not adequate."

For example, the report complained that one set of Army officials and rules oversaw police; another set of officials and rules governed firefighters; and a third, separate set oversaw medical personnel.

Inspectors said that not only did those groups not coordinate with each other, they often failed to consult special response teams and other Army experts on biological, chemical and radiological weapons to develop training criteria and equipment lists.

Inspectors said while the Army had meant to separate and assign key roles to ensure they were accomplished, "the unintended result was a lack of coordination and communication between key Army proponents and technical experts to collectively address installation preparedness issues related to first responders. Additionally, some of the Army's available expertise was underused."

Inspectors called for appointment of one office to oversee all such efforts to ensure better coordination. In response, the office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff said its Installation Preparedness Branch has been assigned that responsibility. It also planned conferences to bring together all major players to coordinate.

Another problem, the report said, is that the Army's Training and Doctrine Command never actually developed training for first responders to attacks by weapons of mass destruction, because it had never received sufficient guidance or doctrine for that from top Pentagon officials.

"Until the doctrine is developed, the Army will not know what equipment and training is needed," the report said.

Army headquarters agreed, and said it would develop doctrine for tactics, techniques and procedures by the end of the current quarter.

The report said such weaknesses led to related problems that thwarted the Army's goal of developing a flexible "standard package" of equipment and training outlines for each base.

Inspectors found that instead of developing such a standard package, separate commands within the Army were often spending millions of dollars to develop their own training and designing their own initiatives to equip first responders "with no assurance that the equipment and training acquired will conform to the (Armywide) doctrine once it is developed."

The Army responded that it will sort through such separate initiatives to ensure they are consistent with the Army's overall plans.

Another problem the report found is that money intended to train first responders often has gone for other, unrelated projects.

For example, inspectors complained that Utah's Deseret Chemical Depot in Tooele County had proposed — and Army Materiel Command had approved — using $700,000 of such funds to relocate propane tanks, better protect a natural gas regulator and upgrade a water fire suppression system.

The report said that was not related to training first responders. So it was among nearly $16 million in projects the Army agreed was questionable, and was canceled. The Army also agreed to more closely "scrub" requests for first-responder training money.


E-mail: lee@desnews.com

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